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1.  Introduction 
 
Innovation is crucial in technology intensive markets. For many firms inventions 
are a critical factor of production. Examples of downstream firms purchasing or licensing 
technology from upstream innovators are common (see, e.g., Arora et al., 2001). Indeed, 
both Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) and the Property Rights Theory (PRT) suggest 
that in many cases, efficiency requires that the inventive process—from the conception of 
an idea through its development and ultimate commercialization—be divided among 
several firms (Williamson, 1975; Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Arora et al., 2001; Arora and 
Merges, 2004). 
The question thus becomes which stages of the inventive process should be 
integrated in a single firm and which should be divided among different firms and traded 
on the market? We argue that the theoretic investigation of the optimal boundary between 
firm and market cannot be carried out in a legal vacuum. Ideally, only the economic 
considerations identified by TCE and PRT should affect the “make or buy” decision. In 
practice, however, law imposes an important constraint on the economic balance between 
firms and markets.  
Critically, the law defines which stages of the inventive process are amenable to 
market trading. As Arrow (1962) recognized, information that is not afforded legal 
protection cannot be bought or sold on the market. Absent legal protection, the 
information holder is in a bind: in order to sell the information, she must disclose it to the 
potential buyer, but once she does, she has nothing left to sell. This paper emphasizes the 
important relationship between Arrow’s paradox of disclosure and the question of the 
boundaries of information intensive firms. Only legally protected inventions, i.e., 
patented inventions, may be traded; pre-patent stages of the innovation process may not. 
Consequently, by force of law, rather than by the guidance of economic principle, pre-
patent innovation must be carried out within the boundaries of a single firm. 
Intellectual property law is therefore an important factor influencing the boundary 
between the firm and the market. When it is more difficult to obtain a patent more 
innovative activity must be integrated within a single firm (or be forgone altogether). 
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Conversely, when the legal requirements of patentability are relaxed, as they have been in 
recent years, a shift of activity from firms to the market should be expected. Trade secret 
law and the legal treatment of covenants not to compete similarly affect firm boundaries 
by determining the allocation of entitlements between firms and employees. 
The implications of innovation for the make-or-buy decision have been 
highlighted by Williamson (1975), Teece (1986, 1988), and Aghion and Tirole (1994). 
Previous work has also recognized the relevance of appropriability and intellectual 
property law to various contractual, strategic and organizational questions in technology-
intensive industries. The importance of appropriability and the relationship between 
appropriability and intellectual property rights was first emphasized by Teece (1986). 
Arora et al. (2001) highlight the difficulty in contracting over tacit knowledge and know-
how (ch. 5), noting “the role of patents in facilitating transactions in technology.” (p. 262) 
Gans and Stern (2003a) consider the implications of the disclosure paradox for an 
entrepreneur’s choice of a commercialization strategy, recognizing the role of intellectual 
property in solving the paradox. In a couple of related empirical studies, these authors 
show how intellectual property rights and appropriability problems affect the timing of 
cooperation/licensing (Gans and Stern, 2003b) as well as the choice of a start-up 
innovator between competition or cooperation (i.e. contracting) with more established 
firms (Gans et al., 2000). Another recent empirical study shows that technologies 
developed by firms operating in countries with weak intellectual property rights are used 
more internally (Zhao, 2003). Anton and Yao, in a series of papers, explore the 
implications of and the strategic responses to the disclosure paradox, caused by imperfect 
legal protection of pre-patent ideas (Anton and Yao, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2003a, 2003b; see 
also Bhattacharya and Guriev, 2004).  
Finally, Dan Burk and Ashish Arora and Robert Merges, in two recent 
contributions, explicitly focus on the interrelations between intellectual property law and 
the boundaries of the firm question. Burk (2004) focuses on the implications of the theory 
of the firm for intellectual property law. While we focus on the reverse implications of 
intellectual property law for the theory of the firm, Burk’s insights are clearly important 
for our analysis. Arora and Merges (2004) show that stronger intellectual property rights 
support smaller firms that specialize in the supply of technology inputs. The analysis in 
Arora and Merges (2004) can be interpreted as proposing one way to minimize the costs 
associated with the disclosure paradox—through intellectual property rights in 
complementary assets (see also Merges, 2000; Arora et al., 2001). Our focus, on the other 
hand, is on intellectual property rights in the core informational asset. More generally, 
while the literature has focused on the strength of intellectual property rights, we focus on 
the preconditions for the creation of legally enforceable intellectual property rights. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple 
model, formalizing the role of intellectual property law as a constraint on the optimal 
level of vertical integration in technology-intensive industries. Section 3 draws the 
broader implications of the model for the structure and organization of technology-
intensive industries, discussing firm size, the role of research universities, R&D alliances 
and joint ventures, and R&D financing. Section 4 argues that intellectual property law 
affects not only the feasibility of the market option but also the feasibility of the firm 
option. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 2
2.  Model  
 
We formalize the effect of intellectual property law on the boundaries of the firm 
question using a simple PRT model.1 Consider an inventor (I) and a developer (D). An 
innovation process combining the efforts of both I and D produces a value V(i,d), where i 
denotes I’s investment and d denotes D’s investment. The value of I’s outside option is 
, and the value of D’s outside option is . Assuming , 
the first-best investment levels are given by 
)(ivI )(dvD )()(),( dvivdiV DI +>
didiV
di
−−),(max
,
. 
Non-verifiability of investments implies contractual incompleteness that restricts 
the parties’ options to a choice between integration (Int) and non-integration (NInt). 
Under the integration option, D owns the product of I’s effort.2 Consequently, I does not 
enjoy any of the value created by her efforts, and is motivated to invest only by the soft 
incentives created within the integrated firm.3 Let  denote I’s investment under 
integration. D’s investment under integration is given by: 
ii Int ˆ=
ddiVd
d
Int −= ),ˆ(maxarg . 
Total net payoffs under integration are: ( ) ( ) IntIntIntIntIntInt didiVdi −−=Π ,, . 
The second alternative is non-integration (NInt), whereby I retains control over 
her invention, and can sell it to D ex post. The non-integration option, however, is not 
always available. Given the disclosure paradox, the NInt option is feasible only if the law 
recognizes the product of I’s efforts as intellectual property, thus affording it legal 
protection. If such IP protection is granted, ex post the parties will negotiate a transfer of 
the legal rights from I to D. Assuming Nash bargaining, the ex post surplus 
 is equally divided between the parties. Hence, I’s ex post payoff is )()(),( dvivdiV DI −−
[ ])()(),()(),( 21 dvivdiVivdi DIII −−+=π , and D’s ex post payoff is 
[ ])()(),()(),( 21 dvivdiVdvdi DIDD −−+=π . The investment levels are given by: 
idii I
i
NInt −= ),(maxarg π  and ddid D
d
NInt −= ),(maxarg π . We assume the existence 
of a unique equilibrium ( )NIntNInt di , . Total net payoffs under integration are: 
( ) ( ) NIntNIntNIntNIntNIntNInt didiVdi −−=Π ,, . 
We can now state the following: 
 
Proposition: When ( ) ( )IntIntNIntNInt didi ,, Π>Π , if I’s invention is legally protected, then 
non-integration will obtain, but if I’s invention is not legally protected, integration will 
obtain. 
 
                                                 
1 The PRT framework employed in this section borrows from Hart (1995) and from Aghion and Tirole 
(1994). A TCE model could readily be developed to capture the same effect. 
2 Theoretically, the reverse form of integration, where I owns the combined product of both parties’ efforts, 
is also possible. Following Aghion and Tirole (1994), we choose not to focus on this form of integration, 
which can be ruled out if I is cash constrained. 
3 These soft incentives include the possibility of promotion/demotion (or even dismissal), 
increased/decreased salary and other monetary and non-monetary benefits and costs conferred by the 
inventor’s managers and peers. See, e.g., Williamson (1975). If the value of the final output V is verifiable, 
then I’s employment contract in the Int case can be made contingent on V, thus improving I’s incentives. 
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An integrated firm cannot replicate the “high-powered incentives” provided under 
non-integration, hence  (Williamson, 1985). Accordingly, the non-integration 
option is more efficient when the marginal importance of I’s investment is large enough 
relative to D’s investment (Grossman and Hart, 1986). But if the law does not protect the 
product of I’s investment, the non-integration option is precluded by the disclosure 
paradox, forcing the parties to integrate.
IntNInt ii >
4
More generally, the Proposition implies that if I’s invention is not legally 
protected integration will necessarily occur, and that such integration will be inefficient 
when ( ) ( )IntIntNIntNInt didi ,, Π>Π . The welfare implications of this result depend on the 
size of the set of cases where non-integration is superior to integration. Characterizing 
this set of cases has been and remains the main task of the boundaries of the firm 
literature. The welfare loss attributed to imperfect intellectual property rights would be 
small, if the law would refuse to protect I’s invention only when integration is the optimal 
organizational structure. Unfortunately, legal rules are not calibrated to the economic 
factors that determine the relative efficiency of integration versus non-integration. In fact, 
the legal distinction between protected and unprotected inventions is probably orthogonal 
to the economic choice between integration and non-integration. 
Finally, the Proposition assumes that the integration option is always feasible. 
This assumption is not always valid. Specifically, when the law precludes the non-
integration option and the inefficiency of forced integration is sufficiently large, the 
innovation project might be abandoned altogether, introducing yet another welfare cost.5
 
3.  Implications 
 
The simple model developed in Section 2 has broad implications for the structure 
and organization of technology-intensive industries: 
 
1) Basic research in commercial firms: Significant R&D at the very fundamental level is 
being done within commercial firms such as IBM and Motorola. While theory does not 
preclude the efficiency of such integration, there is good reason to believe that basic 
research should not generally be integrated with commercial enterprise. The absence of 
legal protection for pre-patent innovation is arguably a contributing factor for the 
integration of such innovation within firms that specialize in development and 
commercialization.  
 
2) Research universities: A major role of universities is to foster basic research at the pre-
patent stages. For present purposes, a research university is an organization, not unlike a 
commercial firm, that can provide soft incentives for R&D activities that do not result in 
a legally protected invention. In addition, public subsidization of basic research in 
                                                 
4 While straightforward non-integration and trade are precluded by the disclosure paradox, in some cases 
the non-integration option cannot be completely ruled out. Even in the absence of legal protection of her 
invention, the inventor may be able to extract some value from the developer. See Teece (1986), Anton and 
Yao (1994, 2002), Arora (2001), Zucker et al. (2001), and Biais and Perotti (2003). Also, in certain 
contexts innovators are driven by non-pecuniary motives and are thus more willing to share ideas across 
firm boundaries. See Lessig (2001), and Benkler (2002). 
5 Regarding the feasibility of the integration option see also Section 4 below. 
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universities can be understood as a response to imperfect intellectual property rights. If 
the law does not protect an invention, then this invention may be developed within an 
integrated firm, or when the inefficiency of the integration option is sufficiently large the 
invention might not be developed at all. Public funding may be the only way—other than 
extending the scope of intellectual property—to ensure the development of such 
inventions. 
 
3) R&D alliances: In the new, technology-intensive economy R&D alliances are an 
increasingly common phenomenon. Given imperfect intellectual property rights, the 
organizational structure of an alliance must respond to problems akin to those underlying 
the disclosure paradox. Specifically, the two partner firms are faced with a choice 
between a contract joint venture, where the object of the alliance becomes the subject of 
an explicit contract, and an equity joint venture, where the two partner firms incorporate a 
separate entity that will conduct R&D activities. When the law does not protect the stage 
of the inventive process that is the subject of the alliance, the partner firms might be 
forced to choose a less efficient equity structure.6  
 
4) R&D financing: The disclosure paradox that plagues the relationship between potential 
sellers and buyers of pre-patent inventions might also prevent efficient external financing 
of the pre-patent stages of the inventive process (see Aghion and Tirole, 1994). Excessive 
integration to enable internal financing might follow. More generally the locus of 
innovation might inefficiently shift to larger firms capable of internal financing.   
 
4.  Employee Mobility 
 
As argued above, intellectual property law affects the viability of the market 
option, thus influencing the boundary between firm and market. But the market option is 
not the only organizational form affected by the law. The viability of the firm, as an 
alternative to the market, also depends on the law’s willingness to protect intangible 
assets. 
Under the PRT, a firm is a collection of assets over which a manager enjoys 
residual control rights. Specifically, the firm controls employees’ access to and use of its 
assets (Hart, 1995). With traditional, tangible assets unauthorized use can be easily 
prevented by restricting physical access to the asset. With intangible assets, however, 
control of access to the asset is often meaningless. When an employee, through initial 
access, acquires certain knowledge, denial of future access will not erase this knowledge. 
Access control is thus powerless to prevent unauthorized use, specifically use by the 
employee after she moves to another firm. If the law does not protect the intangible asset, 
the firm loses all control over the asset; and, in essence, the knowledge ceases to be the 
firm’s asset.7  
                                                 
6 The implications of weak intellectual property rights for the organization of R&D alliances have been 
previously recognized. See Oxley (1997, 1999), Anand and Khanna (2000), Sampson (2004), Majewski 
and Williamson (2003). 
7 In fact, legal protection is also a prerequisite for tangible assets. The firm’s ability to restrict physical 
access to tangible assets relies on the law’s recognition of property rights in these assets. 
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Patent law provides one channel for protecting intangible assets. Kim and 
Marschke (2001) argue that firms patent to reduce the incidence of employees leaving to 
start or join rival firms (see also Merges, 1999). But not all intangible assets qualify for 
patent protection, and some lack the minimal degree of verifiability necessary for patent 
protection. The law provides alternative channels for controlling the use of intangible 
assets by employees. Trade secret law is one such channel (Merges et al., 2003). Another 
channel focuses on direct limitations on employee mobility, through the law governing 
non-compete clauses. See Aghion and Tirole (1994), Gilson (1999), Baccara and Razin 
(2002), Hellmann (2002) and Burk (2004). 
The theory of the firm literature presumes the viability of both the market option 
and the firm alternative, and proceeds to study the optimal choice between these two 
options. The viability of both options, however, depends on the law’s willingness to 
recognize property rights in intangibles. Sections 2 and 3 argued that without such 
property rights innovation that should have ideally been mediated by the market would be 
forced into the confines of a single firm. The present section suggested that even the firm 
haven relies on some form of legal protection. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Intellectual property law directly affects the structure and organization of 
technology-intensive industries by imposing an often binding constraint on the choice 
between integration and non-integration. This characterization of legally determined 
appropriability as a constraint on organizational choice provides a simple theoretical link 
between the growing literature on the organization of innovation and the conventional 
TCE and Property Rights theories of the firm.  
The predictions of our model sit well with the empirical evidence on the 
relationship between legal and organizational variations. Recently intellectual property 
law has made it easier to obtain patent protection for embryonic inventions (see, e.g., 
Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). The increasing importance of small specialty R&D firms 
(see, e.g., Arora and Merges, 2004), the increase in the number of university patents 
(described, for example, in Arora et al., 2001, sec. 10.4), and the prevalence of non-
integration, non-equity research alliances and joint-ventures (see, e.g., Sampson, 2004) 
can be at least partially explained by the relaxation of the legal patentability 
requirements. Similarly, the growth of the venture capital industry arguably was 
stimulated by the law’s increasing willingness to grant intellectual property rights to 
small research start-ups—the archetypal user of venture capital funding. Looking 
forward, our analysis, by identifying the different channels through which intellectual 
property law affects the boundaries between firm and market, suggests a range of testable 
predictions that we hope will motivate future empirical work. 
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